

**Report reflecting the NORDIS research,
fact-checking, and literacy activities against
the recommendations of the Nordic Think
Tank for Tech and Democracy (Nordic
Council of Ministers)**

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Background

The Nordic countries share similar cultures and long-standing democratic values that provide an opportunity for strengthening our democracies even when they take increasingly place online. With this premise, the Nordic Think Tank for Tech and Democracy, set up by the Nordic Council of Ministers, met from April 2022 through April 2023 to discuss the effects of global platform power and the related responses needed to support the Nordic democracies.

One of the key goals of the Think Tank was to consider the new Digital Services Act (DSA) of the European Union and extend its measures for the Nordic context. Also, the proposed European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), focusing on freedom of expression and independent media in national media systems, has inspired the cohort's work. The Think Tank came up with the following [Nordic visions and recommendations](#) to protect and strengthen the democratic debate in the age of Big Tech:

1. We want the Nordic countries to be a united tech-democratic region

1A. Establish a Nordic Centre for Tech and Democracy to support the enforcement of European tech regulation, share experiences, and develop new policies

2. We want the Nordic countries to have thriving and digitally literate citizens

2A. Protect the well-being and safety of children and youth online and push for more general control for citizens

2B. Establish an online hub for knowledge exchange on digital literacy

3. We want the Nordic countries to have access to diverse and credible digital platforms and communities

3A. Support the volunteers who facilitate online communities where democratic debate unfolds

3B. Promote the innovation and implementation of technology that supports open digital public debate to create alternatives to large online platforms

4. We want the Nordic countries to have open and informed public debates

4A. Give public service media a strong digital mandate for online presence, content creation, and development of platforms for democratic debate online

4B. Step up support for independent fact-checkers

4C. Push for better content moderation in the Nordics

4D. Initiate a Nordic task force to oppose the risks to democracy from disinformation generated by artificial intelligence

5. We want the Nordic countries to have vigilant and well-informed oversight of Big Tech platforms

5A. Support access to platform data and algorithms for independent researchers

5B. Commission a biennial report on the state of Nordic digital democracies



In this report, we reflect on **the activities of NORDIS against these five Nordic visions and related proposed actions**. The purpose is to frame the fact-checking activities and research findings of NORDIS to correspond to the policy discussions around the Think Tank recommendations and thus support Nordic policy-making activities. It should be noted that NORDIS is, first and foremost, an EDMO hub that designed its activities two years before the work of the Think Tank. At the same time, the work of NORDIS has, in part, informed the recommendations, given the membership of Anja Bechmann (NORDIS PI, Aarhus University) and Minna Horowitz (NORDIS researcher-member, University of Helsinki) in the Think Tank.

In the following, different activities of NORDIS (September 2021–November 2023) are depicted concerning the Nordic recommendations. The focus is on how they support or further inform the recommended actions and address EU-level policy measures, such as DSA and EMFA, in the [Nordic “digital media welfare states.”](#) This reporting is not only to familiarise the Recommendations for the EDMO and the wider EU community involved in policy work around platformisation and disinformation. This report also seeks to inform national policy-relevant actors, including Ministries and other organizations that have supported the project from the start.¹

¹ NORDIS received letters of support from the Norwegian Media Business Association, Tinius trust in Norway, Norsk Presseforbund, Medierådet/Media Council for Children and Young People, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Journalistförbundet (The Swedish Union of Journalists), Norwegian Media Authority, Yleisradio (Finnish Broadcasting Company), National Audiovisual Institute of Finland, DR - Danish Broadcasting Corporation, DMJX - Danish School of Media and Journalism, MyData Global, The Council for Mass Media of Finland, Finnish Academy of Science and Letter, Helsingin Sanomat - national daily newspaper in Finland, Dagens Nyheter - national daily newspaper in Sweden, University of Iceland, the Alfred Kordelin Foundation in Finland, Facebook, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DK), HybridCoe think tank in Finland.



The Recommendations and NORDIS findings

1A. Support the enforcement of European tech regulation, share experiences and develop new policies.

As noted in the report [Support provided to national authorities by NORDIS – First Year](#), while NORDIS works independently from national and international authorities and private interests, the findings and practical insights of the project have been seen as important to countering global platform power and related information disorders – that is, various forms of false and harmful content and practices online – in the region. Thus, during the project’s first two-year period the NORDIS have shared their expertise with a wide network of stakeholders in informal and formal contexts, such as seminars, conferences, roundtables, and expert groups.

The following NORDIS policy analyses address broad concerns regarding the Nordic media model and welfare states.

[Assessing Information Disorder in the Digital Media Welfare State: A Rights-Based Approach](#)

(University of Helsinki)

This analysis highlights how, in European comparisons, Nordic countries are often considered exceptionally robust in their media systems and highly resilient against disinformation. Even so, so-called platformisation—the penetration of infrastructures, economic processes, and governmental frameworks of digital platforms in different economic sectors and spheres of life—has enriched opportunities but also caused serious harms, such as the viral spread of disinformation in the Nordics.

Numerous statistical indicators indicate a strong Nordic “digital media welfare state,” replicated in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. These countries are structurally highly resilient against disinformation and actively conducting related literacy education on many fronts. Even so, secondary data and interviews still reveal challenges and potential risks.

Most importantly, they reveal a **narrowing down of diversity** in national media systems, **siloed approaches** to disinformation by stakeholders, relatively **limited resources** and tools, the **vague institutional standing** of fact-checkers, a **lack of (shared) data** and frameworks to understand the phenomenon of disinformation; and an **absence of citizen-centric core** standards to assess digital media and information environments.



Drawing from a set of EU policy initiatives aligned with the ideals of the so-called digital media welfare state, this analysis concludes that further work on policy and literacy toward a citizen-centric, rights-based approach is needed. Such a citizen-focused approach is also key in assessing the contexts and impacts of information disorder in the Nordics. Such an approach would focus on citizens' capabilities to participate in society in a highly digitalised environment and the challenges and opportunities for key stakeholders to support those capabilities. The analysis highlights the central role of fact-checkers, literacy experts, and related research in support of right-based, citizen-centric approaches to disinformation.

[How to assess national resilience to online misinformation](#)

(University of Helsinki, with Kaunas University)

This analysis addresses the components and indicators of what constitutes resilience to disinformation from the following perspectives:

1. How resilience against online disinformation can be understood;
2. What indicators could be used to measure national resilience to online disinformation, and
3. Comparative analyses can inform policies regarding common practices and nationally-specific characteristics.

The study focuses on 30 comparative indicators of Finland and Lithuania, depicting **sociopolitical** context, **media** landscape, and media **use**, and reflecting the findings on some qualitative expert interviews conducted within the project, the brief recommends the adaptation of a complex understanding of national resilience to online disinformation: Not only are descriptive indicators central to understanding systemic factors of resilience but the concrete attitudes, values, and capacities of those executing actions to build resilience are central – and the overlooked aspect in policymaking and research.

[Policy approaches to information disorder in the digital welfare state](#)

(University of Helsinki)

Based on expert interviews, this analysis highlights that independent fact-checking is not (yet) a standardized part of the tools to curb online disinformation in Nordic countries. The news media in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland handle their fact-checking needs in-house using their journalists. 4. One exception is Norway, where the collaboration with the media owners works in a mutually beneficial way. The fact-checkers' work is very different in the four countries. There are well-developed routines and large newsrooms in Norway and Denmark. In Sweden and Finland, the actors are small in comparison. The interoperability with the fact-checkers and the national MIL institutions is an important part of all the fact-checkers' work and is integrated into their policies and modus operandi. In Norway and



Sweden, there is also collaboration with the PSM. The fact-checkers need a functioning national policy to ensure their funding, a model that simultaneously guarantees their independence.

[Platform responsibility, legitimacy building and harmful social media content](#) (University of Helsinki)

Based on two academic articles on how different platforms discuss their policies, this analysis highlights how platform value discourses are necessary for legitimization, both in the sense of platforms' efforts to maintain their integrity, build public trust, and construct a positive public image. As online platforms are under growing pressure to respond to the accountability demands from governments and civil society actors, reporting in public blogs and working on their community guidelines functions as an act of discursive legitimation.

2A. Address online safety and more control for citizens, 2B. Foster digital literacy, and 3A. Empower communities to support democratic debate

While the Nordic recommendations refer here to safety and control as features of platform policies, the NORDIS approach has been to address these questions via understanding the information landscape that may foster unsafety, as well as with educational components embedded in literacy efforts. In addition, NORDIS activities – whether fact-checking, research, literacy pedagogy, or policy consultancy – seek to empower expert communities and citizens to participate in democratic debates, including the role of digitalization in Nordic democracies.

As documented in the [Activities of the NORDIS hub – First Year](#) and in the project's final report, the partners have organised numerous national and international events addressing the need for so-called **digital information literacy (DIL)**. NORDIS defines DIL as encompassing safety and control via empowering citizens' literacy capabilities, specifically in online, digital environments:

A set of skills and abilities that everyone needs to undertake information-related tasks: how to discover, access, interpret, analyze, manage, create, communicate, store, and share information in the digital environment. In short, digital information literacy is the ability to think critically and make balanced judgments about any information we find and use - whether or not materials under analysis are valid, accurate, acceptable, reliable, appropriate, useful, and/or persuasive.



Digital information literacy allows us to understand the power and the need for accountability of numerous stakeholders who create technologies, platforms, and content for us in the digital age. Evaluating multiple sources of information empowers us as citizens to reach and express informed views and engage with society from an informed point of view. With the tools of digital information literacy, we can assess the accountability of different actors in the field and demand a better digital environment for us as citizens and consumers, both from corporations and decision-makers.

It should be noted that NORDIS also received a letter of support from the Danish Media Council for Children and Young People. NORDIS has continuously sent them relevant materials and event invitations throughout the project. In addition to informational activities, consultations and literacy events, the following specific activities have contributed to Recommendations 2A and 2B:

[Digital Information Literacy Guide](#), co-produced with [the Finnish Innovation Fund SITRA](#)
(Faktabaari, SITRA, University of Helsinki)

This open-access guide, produced by the Finnish NORDIS member Faktabaari with the Finnish Innovation Fund and in collaboration with the University of Helsinki, is the first of its kind on digital information literacy. It features issues and examples of critical aspects of DIL. It targets all citizens in the digital age and features ways to understand and pedagogically approach the complexities of digital information disorder. The guide serves as a learning material in educational contexts or inspiration for experts addressing various challenges of information disorders to the wider public, including topics such as elements of digital democracy, forms of propaganda, types of information disorder, citizens' communication rights, online reading skills and strategies, lesson's for citizens from fact-checkers, and EU's DigComp 2.2. competencies for citizens.

The guide has been featured in numerous literacy conferences, seminars, and meetings in the Nordics, Europe, and globally. The Guide will be further tested, and supplementary educational material developed with the NORDIS fact-checkers, supported by the research partners, for the benefit of the citizens of their respective countries and in cooperation with the [EDMO literacy community](#). For example, a new chapter on artificial intelligence, focusing on ChatGPT, is being produced in Fall 2023. Faktabaari has also produced the [FactHacker video series](#), summarizing the main findings from the Guide for a broader audience.

[Disinformation and digital information literacy - pilot course](#)
(University of Helsinki, Faktabaari)



The University of Helsinki and Faktabaari designed a Bachelor-level Disinformation and Digital Information Literacy course. By examining the larger media environment, including legacy media, this course provides a critical and contextualized approach to disinformation studies. It equips students to understand better the forms, narratives, policies, and technologies of disinformation. Students also gain knowledge of journalistic, policy and civil society attempts to combat disinformation.

The lesson units address a variety of approaches, ranging from the history of propaganda and its realizations in the social media era to the Digital Services Act and the Code of Practice as policy instruments, definitions of literacy, and EU's DigComp 2.2., and fact-checking in practice. Two special videos of the [FactHacker video series](#) have been created for the course to explain the key concepts of DIL in English. Drawing from collaborations of scholars and professional stakeholders working in disinformation and digital information literacy within NORDIS, the course provides a holistic picture of societal, institutional, and civic/individual challenges and policy, professional, and civic remedies to disinformation.

The aim is to provide the necessary knowledge for future communication professionals to address information disorders. The course was piloted in Spring 2023 and is going to be repeated annually.

[Predicting COVID-related collective anxiety on social media](#)

(Aarhus University)

National interventions in platform policies – for instance, safety – are difficult because national or regional data is difficult to access. This research effort features the largest Nordic social media, Twitter (X), dataset collected during the COVID-19 crisis. The findings highlight a lack of fear in the Nordic Twittersphere in contrast to what could have been expected, based on the results from studies on data from other countries during the pandemic. Instead, most tweets in the data expressed joy or anger. Joy remained stable independently of the rising number of hospitalisations and the increasing number of hours spent at home across all Nordic countries studied in this project. The research may indicate the role of the robust national digital media welfare state that contributed to societal resilience and trust in knowledge institutions during the pandemic. Furthermore, the research exemplifies the need for Nordic-specific data for effective policy-making and targeted literacy activities.

[Emotional landscapes of misinformation spread](#)

(Aarhus University)

Considering the Nordic context, with its resilient democracies and high-trust societies, emotions have been suggested to be particularly important in organising collective action.



The study shows that fear and sadness appeared consistently higher in two types of crisis appraisals, COVID-19 and misinformation, across all the Nordic countries participating in this study. This analysis suggests that the misinformation crisis would be more likely to present a fertile environment for collective action in the Nordic countries than the co-occurring crisis around COVID-19. The research highlights the need for Nordic-specific data for effective policy-making and targeted literacy activities.

Misinformation exposure in the EU and UK (not yet published) (Aarhus University)

An important aspect of addressing online safety is understanding the landscape of demographic exposure to misinformation. Uncovering which demographic groups view the most misinformation as well as differences in the content consumed by different demographic groups, can help inform interventions and digital literacy initiatives. This research effort features a big-data study on misinformation exposure on Facebook between January 2017 and November 2022. An analysis is conducted to show which demographic groups (by age and gender) have been exposed to the most misinformation in the timeframe. The demographic analysis focus on differences on a country level as well as demographic differences in the EU (including UK). The report also presents content analysis of the most-viewed stories for different demographic groups based on age, gender, geographic region, and time-period.

Other related, individual activities can be found on the NORDIS fact-checkers' websites:

- [Faktabaari](#) (FI)
- [Tenk](#) (NO)
- [TjekDet](#) (DK)
- [Källkritikbyrå](#) (SE)

3B. Promote the innovation and implementation of technology that supports open digital public debate

While NORDIS is not directly innovating new arenas for public discussions, it has aimed to update the knowledge about current technological innovations relevant to Nordic and European communities combating disinformation. This, in turn, relates to the key mission of NORDIS in fostering stronger and more coordinated fact-checking activities in the Nordic countries (see also, 4B). Fostering innovation that assists in creating more safe and trusted content online has, in the case of NORDIS, included research on technological practicalities and the potential of innovations that aid the detection of information disorders online, specifically innovations relevant to in small and specific language groups. Nordis has



also interacted continuously with Facebook/Meta as the initial supporter of the project. By actively sending Meta policy material, NORDIS sought to, in its part, impact the company's awareness of Nordic developments and various policies.

[State of the art in fact-checking technology](#)

(University of Bergen)

This report summarises the state-of-the-art fact-checking technology in Europe and the United States and also includes [a database of the latest fact-checking technology](#).

The report stresses that technology is an enabler rather than a complete solution. The path to increased automation is to break down the constituent parts of fact-checking and test whether machines can perform any of these parts accurately. Technology can offer limited functionalities, but many of the challenges experienced by fact-checkers are dependent on the political situation within a country, issues such as obtaining information from certain governments, or lack of transparency and access to information. One of the limitations of attempts to apply AI is the lack of training data since the number of fact-checks worldwide is quite small. There are general problems with introducing AI technology in organisations, such as a lack of human and financial resources, misinterpretations, and unrealistic technology expectations. There are also limitations regarding transparency and open access in fact-checking technology. There is a need to keep methods and tools hidden from the entities that spread false claims to reduce the risk of reengineering by bad actors. Fact-checking can be seen as a form of investigative journalism and when it comes to automation of work tasks there are limited opportunities in unique cases.

[Report on image verification tools](#)

(University of Bergen)

This report documents an analysis of an innovative tool for image verification, FotoVerifier, that follows criteria based on collaboration with fact-checkers: 1) support common image analysis tasks of fact-checkers, including identifying the source of an image and debunking imagery forgery, 2) function as stand-alone prototypes to enable users to test them as proof of concepts, 3) be easily integrated into other existing platforms, such as Truly Media, and 4) be easy to use and have comprehensive tutorials and guidelines.

[Detection methods: a description of the algorithms used to identify problematic content and behaviors, with case studies](#)

(Uppsala University)



This analysis of existing literature and with selected case studies points to several key findings for the fact-checking/verification community: algorithmic studies aimed at fully automating detection tasks risk to simplify 1) the process or 2) the types of information disorder that can be identified. Tools that increase the ability to understand, filter, and summarise the data can be valuable tools to detect interesting data. The format in which fact-checks are stored in databases plays an important practical role: they are currently not designed to facilitate precise matching with new content so matching can become very challenging. Only debunked claims can be downloaded, while problematic content is provided in a link. This leads to the need to access the problematic content separately and eventually collect hundreds or thousands of additional documents.

Handling cross- and multi-lingual data still requires technical advances. While detection is more difficult for lower-resource languages, the lack of resources (data, annotators) is only part of the problem: cultural aspects must be considered in different detection tasks. More country/region-specific fact-checks are needed to train classifiers and research the associated information-spreading dynamics to gain insights about local specificities. Also, support for visual data analysis is important. Still, a gap to fill, but a lot of data is multimodal, which requires going beyond the independent analysis of text or images.

Finally, some of the methods require legal and ethical considerations. When it comes to research, we should consider the issue of compliance with the GDPR and etikprövningslagen (as an example, in Sweden) when it comes to mapping/studying individual social media users. An additional difficulty is the different nature of the involved organisations, with public research institutions having more options for legal bases. Another aspect is that many platforms do not allow data collection for research purposes, making it problematic to use their data legally and ethically. There are big risks associated with using black-box models, especially the lack of transparency/explainability of deep neural models that are becoming increasingly popular in disinformation studies.

[An analytical report on online information propagation: A description of the methods applied to characterize the propagation of stories, with case studies](#)

(Uppsala University)

This analysis examines social media content as coherent sets of posts and their relations (e.g. replies) and looks at the association between stories from different sources. It also analyses features such as the length and pace of the conversation, the overall sentiment of the conversation, user stances, and changes inside individual conversations happening after stories are shared. The case examined is many conversations about immigration from a major Swedish forum. The analysis reveals that conversations, where alternative media content is disseminated, tend to have a higher share of messages with negative evaluations of the immigration agenda but also tend to wane more quickly and be shorter.



The results call into question the effects of exposure to and consumption of alternative media content: content from both mainstream and alternative media is shared by the same sets of actors, and we can only observe limited differences between conversations with no links, with links from mainstream media, and with links from alternative media. This result can aid fact-checkers in their selection processes of checked content.

4A. Give public service media a strong digital mandate

Public service media have traditionally been a typical feature of the Nordic media system but in the past years, have also been recognised in European policy discussions and initiatives as potential key partners in combating information disorders. The supporter of NORDIS include a variety of legacy media organizations and advocacy groups – and by keeping them informed, NORDIS has contributed to the evidence-based analyses of the national media landscapes insofar as they pertain to the dimensions of information disorder. Related work includes the following report:

[Opportunities and challenges of public service media organisations in countering information disorder: The case of the NORDIS countries](#)

(University of Helsinki)

This analysis shows that **contextually**, the NORDIS countries are very similar when viewed in the wider European context with strong national media system in which PSM have a significant role. Audiences in these countries are more aware than Europeans on average about disinformation as a challenge to democracy and feel they know how to detect false information when they encounter it. At the same time, they express less concern about disinformation in their own countries. Research on Sweden also indicates positive correlations between daily usage and high trust in PSM and “the media welfare state of mind” that supports a diverse and robust national media system. Yet, risks of societal polarisation and fragmentation, media ownership concentration, and debates about PSM—their funding, their digital remit—are not absent from the NORDIS countries.

Examining the **content**, all NORDIS PSM organisations engage in all activities stipulated in the Council of Europe’s resolution (2019). Partly this is due to the long legacy of their educational activities and partly to their early digital strategies that continue as innovations with new platforms and technologies, including Artificial Intelligence. NRK stands out as a special case in all of Europe due to its involvement in the activities of Faktisk; the fact-checker that acts as a hub for various activities that combat information disorder in the country.



Expert interviews for this analysis indicate a strong consensus that PSM play a significant, if not the most important, role in combating information disorder and will need to continue to do so in the future. PSM are seen as a vehicle that can bring groups at the margins of the public sphere - e.g., youth, ethnic and linguistic minorities, groups created around a shared issue such as vaccine-critical thinking—into shared knowledge and discussions of common interests.

PSM in the NORDIS countries have a solid foundation and legacy that creates opportunities to safeguard audiences from information disorder. Their most important tools are a consistent focus on the quality and transparency of journalistic processes and educational offerings, the agility to react to extraordinary circumstances, and the mandate and ability to serve diverse audiences.

Major challenges are identified by both the PSM and external experts as pressures from outside factors that might hamper the role of PSM in combating information disorder. **The main, complex challenge is platformisation as an ongoing process**, as it intersects with polarisation and growing distrust in knowledge institutions and with related reactions from political actors and commercial competitors.

4B. Step up support for independent fact-checkers

The recommendation to **strengthen independent fact-checking in the Nordics has been the key mission** of NORDIS – an urgent need also at the policy level, as documented in several analyses (see 1A.) In addition to the NORDIS fact-checkers' joint activities and their presence in European and international fora (incl. Global Facts), NORDIS has produced several analyses on the Nordic and European fact-checking landscape, including an overview of [the state-of-the-art innovations](#) and [innovation of tools](#) (see 3B.) and the following reports:

[Report on the user needs of fact-checkers](#)

(University of Bergen)

This analysis examines innovation challenges in fact-checking work processes and the current state-of-the-art technology about the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools in newsrooms. The report identified four types of tools needed: 1) social network monitoring, 2) political debate monitoring, 3) claim collection and detection, and 4) verification in context. In addition, the report points to concrete characteristics and uses for new tools, ranging from the accessibility and readability of fact-checking results to shared databases of checks, tools for monitoring political debates, and adapting tools to Nordic languages.

Finally, the analysis highlights the requirements for developing and designing new fact-checking tools: the consideration of the journalistic context, ethical principles, and human values, the consideration of the transparency of the process at work, and the need for a human-in-the-loop approach.

[The challenges of resources and tools for fact-checking the Russian-Ukrainian war](#)

(University of Bergen)

This survey maps the work of global fact-checkers in the context of a major crisis, the war on Ukraine. Conducted during the GlobalFact9 conference of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), June 2022, the survey documents the views of 85 fact-checkers from 46 countries. Most respondents recognised themselves as fact-checkers and journalists. 80% worked for a fact-checking organisation, 39% for a news media organisation and 7% for an OSINT organisation, reflecting the variety of the global fact-checking movement. According to their answers, information disorders related to the war mainly relate to audio-visual content. Regarding key challenges, accessing reliable sources came at the top, followed by understanding the language and finding experts. However, results show some differences within the group of Nordic fact-checkers, as they indicated that their third significant difficulty was providing context.

[A method for auditing fact-checking databases](#)

(Aarhus University)

This report provides a blueprint for how to increase transparency in fact-checking digital infrastructure. By systematically comparing two of the largest infrastructures for COVID-19 misinformation – Poynter and Google – the report analyzed how such infrastructure “color” stakeholders’ and thus society’s beliefs of what is false in different ways because they disclose very different stories as shown in the overlap analysis. Differences between, and biases within, infrastructures can be explained by their characteristics – such as differences in organizational structure (international network vs. no membership), different eligibility rules (common Code of Principles vs. Google guidelines) and different funding (NGO dependent on expenditure vs. private company). This indicates that the ownership structure does play a role for the content of the infrastructure and that there is no real unifying global infrastructure of fact-checked stories, but rather supplementary ones. The analysis is important for fact-checkers and the academic community contributing to policy-relevant research on information disorders (see also 5A, [Recommendations](#)).



4C. Support better content moderation in the Nordics and 4D. Oppose the risks from disinformation generated by artificial intelligence

In the Nordic Recommendations, content moderation and the risks by artificial intelligence refer to related possible policy interventions. Related functions are in practical terms embedded in most NORDIS, whether in terms of understanding Nordic Twittersphere (X) and audience needs, in terms of better detection tools, or in terms of DIL.

In addition, the University of Bergen has developed [a Natural Language human-based assessment of automatically generated content](#).

Also, as noted, Faktabaari is during Fall 2023, developing an [addendum to the DIL Guide](#) that will address generative AI, with the example of ChatGPT.

5A. Support access to platform data and algorithms for independent researchers.

As documented in the Final Report of NORDIS, the project has submitted a **Comment to the Delegated Regulation on data access provided for in the Digital Services Act to the EU Commission in response to the Call for evidence** in Spring 2023. NORDIS also invited other Nordic scholars to sign the Comment. In addition, NORDIS has also suggested policy-relevant actions around data:

[Policy recommendations for research and data access to prevent information disorders](#)

(University of Aarhus)

The recommendations highlight that 1) **access to higher-quality data from social media** is needed, as large-scale data studies could provide a fertile foundation for a better understanding of social media behavior for evidence-based policy-making. Unfortunately, data access and quality leave much to be desired – particularly for smaller countries. In addition, 2) **a focus on emotions in misinformation** could help determine the risk of collective behavior and action. 3) **Heightening transparency in fact-checking databases** would benefit stakeholders as research can benefit from better access to fact-checking data and fact-checker insights. Fact-checkers can benefit from the knowledge research can provide on fact-checking and information disorders. Currently, different rating standards, the



role of funding in influencing the selection of fact-checked stories, and the lack of an account of database infrastructural biases hamper transparency. 4) There is also a need to fund **European academic research** in the European context, as much of data-driven research on information disorders is U.S.-focused. Finally, as indicated in several NORDIS analyses, 5) **better small language models** and tools would benefit research.

5B. Commission a biennial report on the state of Nordic digital democracies

This report and the NORDIS final report highlight fact-checking and literacy activities – discussions, conferences, seminars, presentations, pieces of training, and equivalent – that have addressed the state of information disorders in the Nordics from various perspectives. Comparative policy analyses (see 1A., 4A.), analyses of the Nordic Twittersphere (see 2 A.).

Another related NORDIS study pertains to **Nordic audiences' experiences** of media trust and experiences of disinformation (NORDIS report forthcoming in mid November 2023, co-funded with [the Åkerlund Foundation](#)). The results indicate that while some robust and similar traditions of the national media systems still remain, NORDIS countries are simultaneously highly digitalized and showcase the importance of content consumption online and on mobile devices. The top five most used content sources are the same in all countries: social media, television, streaming services, news media websites/apps, and instant messaging. Similarly, the most important news sources are the same in all countries: News media websites and apps are number one everywhere, followed by television. Radio and social media followed, and, surprisingly, home-delivered printed newspapers still ranked 5th or 6th in importance.

The legacy of the Nordic media welfare state model is present in the NORDIS countries: the media audiences generally trust legacy media and are weary of social media content. At the same time, most survey respondents say they encounter disinformation frequently. They are also weary of the commercial pressures of legacy media. The responses to the statements about what builds trust in journalistic media show that from the audience's perspective, trust is composed of many factors. However, the top two responses in the NORDIS countries were the accuracy of the information and the use of clear and informative language. The respondents also recognise factors that threaten their trust in mediated contents: information warfare, the spread of disinformation, the impact of social media on the information one is exposed to, and the overflow of information in the multimedia society are some of their greatest worries pertaining to their national media landscapes and their own media consumption.



The audience survey, and other above-mentioned studies are some elements of NORDIS that showcase the importance of understanding the specific Nordic context of information disorders and more generally the impact of platform power in the Nordics.

